Interview with Pippa Norris: “Populism, Rhetoric, and Democracy: Understanding the Threats and Complexities”

Introduction:

Pippa Norris spoke at the Tocqueville Center’s “Populism in America” event in April, 2025.

Norris is the Paul F. McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. She is the Founding Director of the Electoral Integrity Project, Director of the Global Party Survey, Co-Director of the TrustGov Project, Co-Principal Investigator for Trust in European Democracies (TrueDem), and Vice-President of the World Values Survey. Her research compares public opinion and elections, political institutions and cultures, gender politics, and political communications in countries across the globe. She is ranked “The 2nd Most Cited Political Scientist Worldwide,” according to Google Scholar. Major career honors include: The Skytte Prize; the Karl Deutsch Award from the International Political Science Association; the Charles Merriam, Warren E. Miller, Samuel Eldersfeld and George H. Hallet Awards from the American Political Science Association; and the Sir Isaiah Berlin Award from the Political Studies Association. She has also received several book awards and honorary doctorates and is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. Her recent books include Electoral Integrity in America: Securing Democracy (2019); Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism (2019); and In Praise of Skepticism: Trust but Verify (2022). Her latest book, The Cultural Roots of Democratic Backsliding, is forthcoming with Oxford University Press.

Defining Populism as a Rhetorical Strategy

Q: Could you tell me about populism as rhetoric?

A:
There are a number of different ways of thinking about populism, but I always argue that it has a rhetoric which can be used by any politician. It’s very flexible, very adaptable — and that makes it confusing to understand.

There are two core claims in any populist rhetoric. The first is that the establishment cannot be trusted. Whether it’s intellectuals, scientists, politicians from other parties, the state, public officials, the judiciary — all of those elites are portrayed as corrupt. That’s the first claim: delegitimizing the establishment.

The second core claim is that “we the people” have the legitimate power. Power lies in the grassroots — with ordinary citizens — especially with the majority.

However, we have to think about rhetoric in action. Many politicians use populist rhetoric — even those we wouldn’t typically associate with modern populism. Think about Jimmy Carter or even Ronald Reagan: they ran as outsiders who would clean up Washington in the name of ordinary people. That rhetoric can be very appealing, especially when there’s real corruption or democratic accountability issues.

But behind the words, we have to look at actions and values. The real danger is not populism per se — it’s authoritarianism. Authoritarian populists share populist rhetoric but act on traditional authoritarian values: rejecting unconventional moralities, creating “us vs. them” worldviews, justifying aggression against outsiders, and demanding loyalty to the leader.

Take Trump as an example: he absolutely used populist rhetoric. His inaugural address painted America as a broken, failed nation under threat. But he never empowered the public. He didn’t strengthen deliberative democracy — he used rhetoric to justify a strongman model, with himself acting aggressively in the name of traditional values.
Populism is the facade; authoritarianism is the real threat behind it.

Distinguishing Populism from Authoritarian Populism

Q: It sounds like you distinguish populism from authoritarian populism. Could you explain that a little more?

A:
Populism by itself can be widespread — and in some cases, its ideas are appropriate. Of course, we want the public to play a stronger role in democracy: through referendums, plebiscites, and other forms of activism. And of course, we should root out corruption in government. From a liberal or democratic perspective, it’s hard to criticize populist rhetoric directly without some sympathy.

But beyond the rhetoric, we have to ask: what are they actually doing? In Trump’s first term, actions were limited by “the adults in the room” — experienced advisors in military and economic affairs. Like many outsiders, new leaders often don’t know how to get things done.

The second term, however, is a very different story. With Project 2025 and a clearer strategy, Trump would be able to bring in loyalists who know how to implement changes. That’s the real danger.

Populism opens the door — but what walks through can vary. There are liberal populists, especially on the left, who support welfare states and economic regulation. In fact, some of Trump’s policies — like tariffs to protect American industries — were traditionally left-wing. But when it comes to social conservatism, threats to democracy, the rule of law, and the independence of institutions, Trump’s orientation is clear: it’s authoritarianism, not democratic populism.

Populism, Federalism, and the Republican Principle

Q: You’ve been talking about rhetoric versus action. What about federalism? Sometimes Trump and others return power to the states — for instance during the COVID-19 lockdowns or on issues like abortion and education. How do you see that fitting into the populism versus authoritarianism framework?

A:
It depends on the issue. Trump’s strategy isn’t consistently federalist or centralized — it’s opportunistic.

For example, Trump issued an executive order requiring verification of citizenship to register to vote. But the Constitution says states are responsible for the manner and timing of elections. That executive order is likely to face strong pushback in the courts from states asserting their rights.

Similarly, immigration enforcement — with ICE agents operating in sanctuary cities and states — is a place where the federal government tries to override local decisions.

Ultimately, it’s strategic. On issues like abortion, trans rights, library censorship, and education, it makes sense for Republicans to devolve power to the states because they currently control two-thirds of state legislatures. But on other issues — especially election rules — federalizing power may serve their goals better.

This fits into a deeper tension you alluded to: the tyranny of the majority versus tyranny of the minority. Trump’s Electoral College victory, despite losing the popular vote by 1.5%, reflects how American institutions can magnify minority support into majority power.

The underlying danger isn’t about returning power to states or federalizing power. It’s about using whichever method best serves the aims of an authoritarian populist strategy.

Election Integrity and the Strategic Use of Institutions

Q: Could you also tie this into your work on election integrity?

A:
Republicans currently control most state legislatures, so on certain issues like abortion or education, it’s strategically advantageous to push decision-making down to the states.

On the federal side, Trump and his allies are trying to impose top-down rules — especially on elections. That’s why you’re seeing executive orders to standardize voter verification, even though elections are traditionally state-run affairs.

Similarly, border and immigration enforcement reflects a conflict between local autonomy and federal power. When states or cities declare themselves friendly to migrants, ICE asserts federal authority.

Ultimately, it’s not about principle — it’s about tactical advantage. If the political map changed — if Republicans lost control of many states — they would likely pivot back toward favoring a strong federal executive.

This is part of the broader pattern: the strategic manipulation of institutions to consolidate power, depending on what best serves authoritarian populist goals at any given time.