


Audra Brown  
Easley High School  
Riley Institute  
Summer 2007

## **Made in China:** everything but children.....

Lesson length: three, 60-minute class periods

- A. Map of China
- B. Communism defined and questions
- C. Mao and the development of Communism PowerPoint
- D. Economic Changes from communism
- E. Human Rights- One Child Policy
- F. *The Lost Daughters of China* by Karin Evans



**China**

Brainstorm for any term that characterizes China and list the word on the map.

## What is communism?

### Communism

<http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/communism>

**1 a** : a theory advocating elimination of private property **b** : a system in which goods are owned in common and are available to all as needed

1. What is your definition of communism?
2. Do you think that communism is a good theory/idea?
3. Do you think that communism is good for the people that live in a communist society?
4. Do you think that communism is good for the people that control the communist society?



**Name:** Mao Zedong

**Country:** People's Republic of China

**Birthday:** December 1893

**Died:** September 1976

**Dates in Power:** 1949-1976

**Nuclear Capability:** yes

**Major Achievements:** Mao Zedong was chairman of the communist party of China between 1945-1976, responsible for the deaths of between 14 and 20 million people by starvation during the failed "Great Leap Forward". Also known for his purges during the "Cultural Revolution", which resulted in an unspecified number of millions dead.

<http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.dictatorofthefmonth.com>

# The Death of Communism in China

by James A. Dorn

*James A. Dorn is vice president for academic affairs at the Cato Institute and editor of China in the New Millennium: Market Reforms and Social Development.*

Although China will commemorate 50 years of Communist Party rule this year, communism is dead in the hearts and minds of its people.

Like their former comrades in Russia and Eastern Europe, the Chinese people prefer market riches to Marxist dogma. Now even the Communist Party leaders are conceding that private enterprise is here to stay.

At its annual meeting, scheduled to begin today, the National People's Congress, China's parliament, is expected to amend article 11 of the constitution and officially recognize that privately owned enterprises are an "important part of the socialist, market economy."

The diminishing role of state-owned enterprises, SOEs, and the raising status of non-state enterprises, including private firms, are realities that the ruling elite can no longer ignore. State enterprises account for only 30% of industrial output, but their political pull has meant that they still capture the bulk of investment resources - bureaucrats directed 70% of state bank loans to SOEs last year. With the change in the constitution, private firms hope to be able to compete on a more equal basis for scarce capital.

If the people's congress does approve the constitutional change and recognizes "multiple forms of ownership" in addition to state ownership, the Communist Party will be admitting what the common folk already know: The future of China lies with free markets and private property.

In a 1997 Gallup survey, interviews with both urban and rural residents in China found that the most commonly held attitude toward life was "Work hard and get rich" (56%), while the least popular was "Never think of yourself, give everything in service to society" (3%). Today, unlike the time of the Cultural Revolution 30 years ago, one's own future comes first. And that future is in the vibrant market sector, not in the stagnant state sector.

Nearly a decade after the Tiananmen Square uprising, President Jiang Zemin has made "stability" the No. 1 policy to ensure no deviation from the basic party line. But his increasingly harsh crackdown on dissidents is a sign of weakness, not of strength.

The truth is, the Communist Party of China is weaker now than at any time since 1949. The economic liberalization that began in 1978 has given more power to the people, and, unintentionally, undercut the Party's power.

People have little faith in industrial enterprises or banks run by the state. They know that, regardless of official rhetoric to the contrary, government ownership means party control. But that authoritarian approach to economic organization has been a giant failure for all to see.

The dismal condition of SOEs, the deterioration of state budgetary revenues, and the fragile condition of China's banking sector threaten the very existence of the party. That is why China's leaders are nervous.

The decrease in budgetary revenues from the shrinking state sector has been dramatic. Tax revenues have fallen from 35% of gross domestic product in 1978 to 11%. The economic base of the party is in freefall. And to add fuel to the fire, China's state-run banks are faced with a mountain of non-performing loans.

China cannot solve its economic problems alone. That is why it is essential for the West, especially the United States, to continue its policy of engagement and refine its policy of engagement.

The United States should help move China in the direction of greater economic and personal freedom by normalizing trade relations, integrating China into the global trading order, and promoting exchange on a broad front. Congress should not let the bilateral trade deficit with China interfere with that strategy.

Any movement away from freer trade and toward protectionism would only delay China's progress toward freedom and prosperity and harm the global economy. Trade sanctions should be used only in extreme cases and only when they have a high chance of success; too often they can delay real reform.

President Clinton's decision in 1994 to delink trade and human rights and the decision of Congress in 1998 to substitute the term "normal trade relations" (NTR) for "most favored nation" were steps in the right direction. Now Congress must act to reduce uncertainty in U.S.-Chinese economic relations by ending the annual certification spectacle and making NTR unconditional and permanent. Both Hong Kong and Taiwan support such a move and would benefit from it.

Likewise, China should be admitted to the World Trade Organization as soon as possible, provided China respect the principles of a liberal trading order, including the rule of law and the principle of non-discrimination.

Congress should recognize that advancing economic freedom in China has had positive effects on the growth of China's civil society and on personal freedom. Today, millions of Chinese are able to travel freely, own their own homes, choose their own clothes, show affection in public, select their course of studies, and work where they want to.

As President Clinton said in his State of the Union speech, "The more we bring China into the world, the more the world will bring change and freedom to China."

Despite continuing human rights' violations, the China of 1999 is not the China of the Cultural Revolution. Although the pace of progress has been slow, China is creeping along in the right direction.

The torch of liberty will burn brighter only if China continues to open to the outside world. It is in the interest of world peace and prosperity that the West not lose the opportunity to engage China and let communism die a natural death.

*This article originally appeared in The Journal of Commerce, March 5, 1999.*

<http://www.cato.org/dailys/03-09-99.html>

## What about Human Rights?



<http://www.globecartoon.com/china/timeline2.html>

Read excerpts from: *The Lost Daughters of China*

1. What effect has communism had on the people of China's individual rights?
2. Do you think that China's effort to control their population is relevant?
3. Do you think that China's method of controlling their population is humane?

Draw a picture of what you think a city in China looks like under communist rule.



dong's bungled attempt to reorganize China's agricultural system as part of the Great Leap Forward. The changes he instituted—forcing peasants out of individual farms and into communal production managed by a central authority, for instance—resulted in massive crop failures and starvation for farmers in the years between 1958 and 1961. Although the immensity of the tragedy escaped serious Western attention until well after the fact, estimates are now that some 30 million people died in a three-year period.

According to Jasper Becker, author of *Hungry Ghosts—Mao's Secret Famine*,<sup>41</sup> the disaster amounted to the least recognized and most severe famine in recorded human history—as if every single man, woman, and child in the entire state of California had perished from hunger and no one outside the California border had taken any notice. Half the casualties were children under ten. Untold numbers of children were left crying beside the bodies of their dead parents. Along roadsides in northwest China, desperate people scooped out holes in the soft yellow clay and left their children, hoping more fortunate travelers would come upon them and have mercy. American parents talking about “the starving children in China” at the dinner table in attempts to get their own children to eat didn't know the half of it.

Even foreign correspondents stationed in China at the time managed to remain unaware of the devastation. Mao himself tried to hide the disaster from the world until it was too late for help. So distanced were some of the later discussions of this tragedy that American academics managed to quibble among themselves about whether it was appropriate for a writer like Becker to use emotionally charged phrases such as “starved to death” as opposed to the more acceptable “excess

mortality” when talking about the loss of tens of millions of human beings.<sup>42</sup>

It was against this bleak scenario—though not necessarily because of it—that China's so-called one-child policy came to be. At the end of the Mao era, with the specter of the famine still lingering and with a growing impulse toward economic development, population control became a priority for the People's Republic of China.

Mao, however, had spurned the idea of slowing the nation's birthrate, viewing it as a Western strategy to reduce China's influence. He had, in fact, celebrated the idea of “glorious mothers having more babies,” and the voices of those who expressed doubts were brutally stifled.<sup>43</sup> When the Cultural Revolution came along, it managed to postpone any further discussion for at least another five years. It was not until well afterwards that the climate changed sufficiently that discussions could resume. By 1972, with China's population swelling toward one billion people, a state council announced that population control was essential to the socialist revolution. When China's new leaders such as Deng Xiaoping looked forward, the emphasis was on chasing the booming “tiger” economies of China's most prosperous Asian neighbors.

Although the threat of another famine might seem reason enough to most untutored observers to keep numbers down, the People's Republic viewed population control as a way to boost economic development and growth. The leadership believed that fewer mouths to feed meant a better chance at prosperity for more people. A rising standard of living meant better odds for political stability and a place for China in the world hierarchy of emerging nations. Yet by this point, it was probably already too late. As writer Hong Ying points out, “The disaster

would take at least half a century of draconian policy and human tragedy to correct."

In 1980 came the official government announcement<sup>44</sup> that set the ground rules for what came to be known—rather inaccurately—as the one-birth-per-couple, or one-child, policy. With that decree, which became national policy, the government wedged a foot into the bedroom door of every household in China. "Use whatever means you must to reduce the population, but do it," came the edict.

The government placed its hopes for prosperity in a mathematical vision of diminishing numbers. "Eight-four-two-one," went one saying, meant to describe the shrinking family—eight great-grandparents, four grandparents, two parents, one child. The target figure worked out to 1.6 children per couple, which built in the government's realistic assumption that a lot of people—some with the government's permission—would have more than one child. At the time a substantial number of Chinese families were routinely having five or six children.

As if the heavy burden of tradition hadn't landed heavily enough on China's females already, the government's population policy ushered in a whole new set of troubles for girls and women both, particularly in the countryside. Had a more moderate course been taken, and taken far, far earlier, there are some arguments that economic development and education might have naturally, over time, reduced the tendency to have large families and might have slowed the booming birthrate. But China put into place the most drastic birth control policies in the world and enforced them, in certain areas, with brutal zeal.

At first, a birth control "high tide" was launched. Early on, the suggestions were relatively gentle. Such slogans as "One is best, don't exceed two" went round. But the state's grip soon

tightened, as China forecast an economic crisis and began a huge push toward development and modernization. The general policy called for later marriages (age twenty-two for men, at least twenty for women, though twenty-four for women was considered ideal), fewer children, and a longer space (about four years) between children. In theory, each family would be allowed just one child—sometimes under special circumstances a second, providing that the children were sufficiently spaced, and the officials could be persuaded of a pressing need. Ethnic minorities within China—there are numerous strains, particularly in the borderlands, but they add up to less than 10 percent of the population as a whole and were in some cases diminishing—were routinely allowed two children.

A certain piece of paper became immensely important in China. *Shengyu zheng*, it was called—"birth permission paper"—the state's version of blessings for mothers. It gave a woman official sanction to conceive and bear a child, a right she no longer had without it. She was required to have a permit when she became pregnant, and to take the paperwork to the hospital with her at the time of delivery.

With marriage came the state's requirement to sign an agreement to comply with the birth quotas. Those who cooperated could receive a Birth Planning Honor Card and preferential treatment for food, housing, health care, and education. Those who didn't agree could be hounded until they did. If they still held out, they were subject to punishment—fines, loss of benefits and jobs, even jail.

Once the new rules had been set, the very nature of the Communist party state gave the government the right and the power to interfere in the most personal realm of people's lives. And interfere it did. From the beginning, the government's approach

set it at odds with contemporary world guidelines on family planning, which emphasize not forced compliance but the empowerment of women to make informed, responsible choices.

The long arm of the Chinese state reached into every household. Women who became pregnant without permission were confronted and, if officials decided it was necessary, marched to abortion clinics. Once a child was born, a woman was required to have an IUD inserted and periodically checked. After the birth of a second child, either husband or wife was to be sterilized. Forced sterilizations, mandatory insertions of metal IUDs—which could be monitored by X ray to make sure they remained in place—became commonplace assaults on the women of China, as did forced abortions, even at full term.<sup>45</sup>

Party workers and local officials were rewarded or punished, depending on how well they met the quotas set for their areas. Some population control offices had special boxes where anonymous informants could tell officials which women in the community might be attempting to hide a pregnancy. Posters went up, labeling those who opposed the state's birth control policies as class enemies. Officials of the Women's Federation of the Communist Party kept track of women's monthly cycles, and listed those to be sterilized and those required to have IUDs inserted.<sup>46</sup>

Employers, too, began to supervise their female employees, watching them for signs of pregnancy, sometimes posting their menstrual cycles publicly, pressuring them into abortions if the timing of the pregnancy didn't suit the rules or the work schedule. Writes Bill McKibben in *Maybe One: A Personal and Environmental Argument for Single-Child Families*: "No parent, for any reason, should ever have to make a choice to abandon a child. But in China, it's hard to avoid. In factories family

planning workers monitor women to make sure they do not become pregnant. 'We watch for women who start to eat less or who get morning sickness,' explained one Changzhou functionary. '... No one has ever become pregnant without one of us finding out.'<sup>47</sup>

In 1997, a maid named Sun Lili, employed by a government-owned hotel in Beijing, became pregnant, only to be told by her employer that her condition was "inconvenient." She was ordered to take "remedial measures," meaning an abortion. She refused when a doctor said another abortion (she'd already had two in the past two years when she'd become pregnant without official sanction) would forever end her chances to bear a child. Sun Lili was fined five months' salary, stripped of her medical coverage, and eventually lost her job.

She went on to have her baby, a little girl, and in a rare instance of anyone, much less a woman, fighting the Chinese system, she brought a lawsuit, which was at the time of this writing still making its way through the Chinese courts—not known for supporting the rights of individuals against the power of the state.<sup>48</sup>

China's women, whether they lived in an area where the quotas and enforcement were relatively lax or where the rules were rigidly defined and adhered to, were the focus of enforcement, oversight, and punishment. If sterilization was ordered, it was most often the wife who was sterilized, despite government pronouncements that both men and women shared the responsibility for family planning. In China—as elsewhere in the world—the burden of contraception, state-dictated contraception included, fell on women.<sup>49</sup>

Birth control workers sometimes referred to women who begged to keep their children, born or unborn, as "pleaders."