

*Militant and Cooperative Internationalism  
Among American Religious Publics, 2008*

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### ***Abstract***

Although there has been a great deal of speculation about the influence that religious factors play in shaping American attitudes on foreign policy issues, there are very few empirical analyses testing that influence. In this paper, we use a large national sample of the American public to classify American religious groups on two distinct dimensions of foreign policy attitudes, *militant internationalism* and *cooperative internationalism*. We find rather different religious constituencies for the issues subsumed by these dimensions, and demonstrate the influence of both *ethnoreligious* and *theological* factors in shaping public attitudes. Combining the two foreign policy dimensions, we show that religious groups in America are differentially located in the classic categories of *hardliner*, *internationalist*, *accommodationist*, and *isolationist*. The paper concludes with some observations on the implications of the findings for the future of American foreign policy.

## ***Introduction***

Although the study of religion's role in American political life has made enormous strides in the past two decades, the progress has been uneven. Scholars have put religious factors on the agenda in the fields of voting behavior, party politics and, to some extent, public opinion (Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009). But there has been much less interest in connecting religious factors to attitudes on foreign policy. Indeed, some respected analysts deny that there is anything to study. For example, Kohut and Stokes' extensive and much-cited review of Americans' attitudes stresses that "with the exception of policy toward Israel, religion has little bearing on how they think about international affairs" (2006, 94). Few political scientists have considered the way that religion influences foreign policy attitudes, despite J. Bryan Hehir's reminder that "religious convictions and concerns" have permeated U.S. foreign policy since World War II (2001, 36).

The neglect of religion by political scientists has recently been highlighted by an enormous outpouring from journalists (Mead 2004, 2006; Phillips 2006; Clark 2007), historians (Boyer 2005; Guyatt 2007; Oren 2007), diplomats (Urquhart 2005; Carter 2005; Albright 2006), religion scholars (Northcott 2004; Urban 2006; Marsh 2007), sociologists (Martin 1999; Derber and Magrass 2008), philosophers (Singer 2004), and even literature and communications analysts (Domke 2004; Collins 2007). These authors have made strong claims both for the influence of religion on American public attitudes on foreign policy and about its impact on political leaders. Such assertions are even more common abroad, both among intellectual elites and in the mass public. No one reading European journals of opinion, from *The Economist* to *Le Monde*, would doubt that European intellectuals believe that American foreign policy reflects religious influences, or that this notion has widespread appeal among ordinary citizens as well (Braml 2004; Kohut and Stokes 2006).

There are two major—and not entirely compatible—themes in this new body of work.

The first (and dominant) theme focuses on the support religion provides to “hegemonic” policies specifically by contributing to militarism, dogmatic unilateralism, dualistic moralism, nationalistic assertiveness, anti-scientific attitudes, and apocalyptic attachment to Israel. Works in this genre invariably focus on American Evangelicals, whose religious beliefs are labeled variously as “fundamentalist,” “premillennialist,” “dispensationalist,” “biblical literalist,” or “messianic.” These views are connected back to those infusing earlier themes in American history such as Manifest Destiny or Special Providence (McCartney 2004; Judis 2005) and, it is asserted, were especially influential during the administration of George W. Bush, invariably regarded as a paradigm of an Evangelical worldview. In any event, literally hundreds of articles in elite and popular journals of opinion—in the United States and abroad—have elaborated upon this theme (see Guth 2006, and Kohut and Stokes 2006, for typical examples).

A smaller, emerging counter-literature takes on a rather different theme, however, even while observing the same religious groups. Some journalists have focused on Evangelical activity, supported by a changing cast of other religious groups, in addressing a wide range of international crises: fighting for human rights, protecting the global environment, expanding international relief and rescue operations, combating AIDS in Africa, and working for more ambitious economic development programs. Indeed, Bill Kristof, a *New York Times* columnist not known for fundamentalist sympathies, famously referred to the Evangelical community as “the new internationalists” (Kristof 2002). A few academic observers have written in the same vein, finding redeeming traits in the foreign policy concerns of conservative Christians (Hertzke, 2004; Guth et al. 2005; Mead 2006; den Dulk 2007; Farr 2008; Wuthnow 2008; McCleary 2009). Some analysts have claimed that this set of policy tasks is creating new attitudes among

religious traditionalists and new alliances across old religious divides. Ben Weyl (2009), for example, finds that religious liberals and conservatives are making common cause on this new agenda, overcoming old lines of division. Indeed, President Obama's religious strategy during the 2008 campaign and in office presumes just such developments (Guth 2009a).

Unfortunately, works embroidering both these themes tend to be based on simplistic views of American religion. First of all, many accounts are concerned primarily with the activities of religious leaders, with relatively little data on the attitudes or actions of the religious public, even though we know there are often enormous gaps between organizational elites and rank and file members. Secondly, what attention has been given to public attitudes is often too narrowly focused on Evangelical Protestants. Few analysts consider the other seventy-five percent of the American public, creating an analytic dualism that arrays Evangelicals against “secular” opinion (presumably everyone else). This ignores the fact that other religious groups often have distinctive attitudes toward foreign policy, as Alfred Hero (1973) demonstrated long ago. After all, Catholic and Mainline Protestant churches, as well as American Jewish leaders, have long sought to influence both public and policymakers, perhaps more doggedly and over a longer period than Evangelicals (Billingsley 1990). Nor does it consider the possibility that the growing unaffiliated or secular public may have truly distinctive foreign policy preferences as well (Hout and Fischer 2002). Thus, the emerging literature, both polemical and scholarly, may overstate the distinctiveness of one religious group, ignore the potential influence of others, and treat American religion in a simplistic manner.

In this paper, we hope to present a broader picture of the religious factors that shape contemporary attitudes on American foreign policy. To accomplish this, we first describe two fundamental orientations that dominate the literature on religion's political role in the United

States, the *ethnoreligious* and *religious restructuring* theories, suggesting some ways that each perspective may help account for foreign policy attitudes. We then portray the distribution of American religious opinion on foreign policy issues, using the classic “Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau” typology, focusing on two attitudinal dimensions, *militant internationalism* and *cooperative internationalism*. Although these dimensions do not subsume all the foreign policy issues confronting the United States, they have proved remarkably stable over time, despite changing agendas (Holsti 2004). They are especially useful for our purposes, as each corresponds to one of the broader themes of the emerging religion and foreign policy literature.

### ***Religious Groups in American Politics***

Any assessment of American politics must consider two competing interpretations of religious alignments. *Ethnoreligious theory* emphasizes the historic European religious groups that migrated to America and often multiplied upon reaching her shores. Nineteenth-century party politics consisted largely of assembling winning coalitions of contending ethnoreligious groups (Kleppner 1979). Well into the twentieth century, the GOP represented historically dominant Mainline Protestant churches, such as Episcopalians, Presbyterians and Methodists, while Democrats spoke for religious minorities: Catholics, Jews, and Evangelical Protestants (especially in the South). By the 1980s, these configurations had shifted, as Mainline Protestants dwindled in number, Evangelicals moved toward the GOP, the ancient Catholic—Democratic alliance frayed, and black Protestants became a critical Democratic bloc. Growing religious diversity added Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and others to the equation, usually on the Democratic side. Even today many analysts think in ethnoreligious terms, referring to the “Evangelical,” “Catholic,” “Jewish” or “Muslim” vote. Although the assumptions underlying

this analytic framework are often incompletely articulated, historians in this school usually argued that ethnoreligious groups held differing worldviews, cultural preferences, and negative reference groups—all shaping their views on public policy, including foreign affairs (Swierenga 2009).

A few historical and contemporary examples might illustrate the relevance of ethnoreligious traditions to foreign policy attitudes. The distinctive attitudes of Irish Catholics toward American relations with Great Britain and the isolationism of German Lutherans and Catholics during the early twentieth century are just two examples of ethnoreligious influence. Catholic anticommunism in the 1940s and 1950s was shaped not only by Church pronouncements against that “Godless” system, but also by ethnoreligious solidarity with Eastern European relatives and friends under Soviet domination. The persistent support of American Jews for Israel and the more recent interest of black Protestants in policy toward Africa are just two examples of special concerns of a host of American “ethnoreligious fragments” (Uslaner 2007). Indeed, one might even argue that the recent growth of these religious minorities, celebrated (and exaggerated) in Diana Eck’s *A New Religious America* (2001) will encourage a new kind of internationalism in American foreign policy: as America looks more like a United Nations, it might look more favorably on the United Nations.

An alternative way of understanding American religion is the *religious restructuring* or *culture wars* theory, introduced first by Robert Wuthnow (1988) as an explanation of growing divisions in American faith traditions, but brought into common political parlance by James Davison Hunter’s *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (1991). Hunter saw new religious battles emerging *within* the old traditions, based on theological differences: “Orthodox” believers accept “an external, definable, and transcendent authority,” and adhere firmly to

traditional doctrines, while “progressives” replace old religious tenets with new ones based on personal experience or scientific rationality (Hunter 1991, 44). The progressives are often joined by secular Americans who reject religion entirely but see morality in the same way. In the days since Wuthnow and Hunter wrote, the number of religiously unaffiliated Americans has grown, enhancing their potential influence and presumably bolstering the “progressive” side. These religious divisions quickly congealed around issues such as abortion, feminism, gay rights and the role of faith in public life, but soon showed evidence of infusing other attitudes as well.

Indeed, the dominant theme of the literature cited above reports the echoes of these battle cries in foreign policy debates. Some influences are extensions of those in domestic politics, as when Catholic and Evangelical traditionalists fight population control policies of American international aid agencies, the United Nations and other international bodies, or insist on “abstinence only” strategies for fighting AIDS in Africa. More significant, perhaps, are the less obvious connections, by which religious traditionalists purportedly identify American foreign policy objectives with divine goals, or infuse American military adventures with divine purpose. And although the impact of “progressive” theologies has been less discussed, presumably the communitarian social theology of many Mainline Protestants and liberal Catholics should be conducive to support for a more cooperative foreign policy, focused on social welfare, economic development, and protection of the natural environment (Guth et al. 1997, 58-77).

Although Hunter’s “culture war” thesis captivated some scholars and pundits, most analysts concluded that his dualist model was too simplistic, that moral battle lines shifted from issue to issue, and that many citizens were noncombatants (Williams 1997; Fiorina 2005). Some scholars have confirmed, in part, the political cleavages Hunter envisioned (Layman 2001), but old markers of ethnoreligious tradition still retain much influence over public attitudes and

political choices. Thus, understanding the complex religious politics of foreign policy attitudes requires both the ethnoreligious and restructuring perspectives.

### ***Militant and Cooperative Internationalism among Religious Groups***

Although religion might have distinct kinds of influence over specific individual foreign policy issues, we want to focus on the way it undergirds broader orientations. Scholars have increasingly agreed that Americans hold certain overarching foreign policy predispositions that shape their reaction to specific issues. As three experienced analysts have noted, the “most widely used structure for American foreign policy beliefs is the Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau model” (Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995, 313). Eugene Wittkopf (1990) famously proposed that ever since the Vietnam War American attitudes on most foreign policy issues fell along two dimensions, *militant internationalism (MI)* and *cooperative internationalism (CI)*.

Although the precise components of each dimension vary with available survey items, militant internationalism focused on the dangers presented by the USSR, the necessity of a strong military, willingness to use force to protect American interests, and a zero-sum interpretation of international conflict. After the demise of the Soviet Union, other enemies arguably provided a substitute focus, such as Islamic terrorists after 2001 (Cimino 2005; Smidt 2005; Kidd, 2009). Cooperative internationalism, on the other hand, represented a largely independent dimension that focused on the value of international cooperation and international institutions, such as the UN, and stressed especially “North-South” issues such as hunger and economic development (Holsti 2004). Astute readers will immediately recognize that the dominant theme in the recent work on religious influences has implicitly emphasized the militant

internationalism of American religious groups, while the emerging theme focuses on religious activities directed toward the cooperative internationalism dimension.

Wittkopf combined these dimensions to produce a four-fold typology of foreign policy attitudes among leaders and citizens: *hardliners* (high on MI and low on CI), *internationalists* (high on both), *accommodationists* (low on MI, high on CI), and *isolationists* (low on both scales). Several scholars have confirmed that these groups react in predictable ways when confronted with foreign policy choices. And although other scholars have proposed theoretical and empirical schemes that are slightly different, the Wittkopf scheme has been widely used, especially for heuristic purposes, as we will in this paper.<sup>1</sup>

To map out the religious dimensions of foreign policy attitudes in 2008 we draw on the National Survey of Religion and Politics (NSRP), conducted by the University of Akron. This survey, run in every presidential election year beginning in 1992, has the advantage of a large national sample and detailed questions on religious affiliations, beliefs and behavior (see Green 2009). This permits us to characterize with some confidence the opinions of a wide range of religious groups, using both ethnoreligious categories emphasized by historians, and the restructuring factions delineated by sociologists of religion, at least as they have developed within the three largest American religious traditions, Evangelical and Mainline Protestantism and European-origin Catholicism.

The 2008 NSRP included fifteen policy items with some connection with foreign affairs, including both a set of priority items and several issue questions. Although measured with

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<sup>1</sup> There is an expansive literature on how to conceptualize foreign policy attitudes among American political leaders and the American public (Peffley and Hurwitz 1993; Page 2006). Some critics of the Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau framework argue for the existence of at least one additional dimension, usually involving international issues with strong domestic implications, such as trade and immigration policies (Chittick, Billingsley and Travis 1995). Nevertheless, almost any empirical exploration of an extensive range of foreign policy questions produces at least two major dimensions that can be interpreted as militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism—although some authors may give them a different meaning.

somewhat different metrics, preliminary factor analysis confirmed that most items fell into the two familiar dimensions, with eight items constituting a MI scale, and four others making up a CI scale.<sup>2</sup> Like other scholars, we also discovered a weak (and loosely organized) third factor that we might label *American Domestic Interests*, comprising questions on free trade, immigration control, and protecting American jobs (cf. Holsti 2004; Chittick, Billingsley and Travis 1995). In the remainder of the paper, however, we focus on the location of religious groups on the MI and CI scales, run multivariate analyses of the influence of religious factors on both, and then present evidence on the distribution of religious groups within Wittkopf's fourfold typology. We conclude the paper with some observations on how religious factors might influence foreign policy in the future.

### ***Militant Internationalism***

We first consider the relationship of religion to militant internationalism. As we have noted, much of the speculative literature on religious influence focuses on this dimension of public opinion, with primary emphasis on Evangelical Protestants. And the limited empirical work done recently has also addressed this attitudinal dimension. For example, Barker, Hurwitz and Nelson (2008: 308) investigate “messianic militarism”; Froese and Mencken (2009: 105) consider the effects of “sacralization ideology” on support for “neoconservative foreign policy ideology”; Baumgartner, Francia and Morris (2008) find Evangelicals more likely to support “hawkish foreign policy toward the Middle East”; and Guth (2009b) shows the impact of conservative religious orientations on public support for the “Bush Doctrine.” Thus, we should expect distinct religious influences here, especially from Evangelicals.

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<sup>2</sup> See Tables 1 and 2 below for the specific items and factor loadings. The MI scale has a *theta* reliability of .75, while the CI scale, with fewer items, has a *theta* of .64, slightly lower than desirable, but nevertheless manageable (Holsti 2004). Although we would like more items for the CI scale, the strong face validity of the questions and the high loadings they have demonstrated in the past on this dimension even when more items were available assures us that we have a valid measure.

Of course, other religious groups might make their own contributions toward public attitudes here. Mainline Protestant denominations and the Catholic Church have adopted policies critical of American military power and skeptical about its use. For the Mainline churches, these official attitudes have existed at least since World War I, and for the Catholic hierarchy in the United States, since at least the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s (Wald 1992). In recent years, both traditions have opposed use of American troops in the Gulf Wars, especially the second one (Tipton 2008). And although other religious groups have been less outspoken on these issues, we might suspect that some may also exhibit a distinct influence on their members' perspectives.

[Table 1 about here]

In Table 1 we report the proportion of each religious group reporting “militant” responses to the eight items in the Militant Internationalism (MI) scale. As the results for the entire sample suggest, in 2008 Americans showed varying support for these items. A strong national majority gave “very high” priority to fighting international terrorism, with a slightly smaller proportion approving pre-emptive military action to protect American interests. Just over half put “very high” priority on maintaining a strong military and saw the United States as having a special role in world politics. Smaller numbers (but still pluralities when “undecideds” are considered) thought the U.S. should stay in Iraq until the situation was stabilized, concluded that the Iraq war was justified, believed that the U.S. must take an active role in the world, and sided with Israel rather than the Palestinians.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> We should note here that the item on Israel “loads” nicely with the other militant internationalism items, perhaps a change from an earlier situation where attitudes toward the Middle East were “orphans” to the MI/CI scheme (Holsti 1992). See Holsti (2004, 187-88) for some speculation on this development. For religious influences on American attitudes toward Israel, see Guth et al. 1996; Mayer 2004; and, Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris, 2008.

Fairly consistent religious patterns emerge. First, as we might expect, Evangelicals were the most supportive of militant internationalism, with solid and sometimes large majorities taking the MI position on issues. Indeed, two-thirds of Evangelicals fall in the top half of the MI scale and they consistently exceeded their Mainline brethren on each item. White Roman Catholics resembled Mainliners on most issues, but were slightly less supportive of Israel and somewhat *more* likely to approve American military strength and action (despite the contrary position of the Vatican and American Catholic bishops). In the summary assessment, very small majorities of both Mainliners and Roman Catholics fell into the upper half of the MI scale, confirming the opinion diversity in each tradition.

One source of that diversity is suggested by scores of theological factions within each major tradition.<sup>4</sup> With a few transpositions (especially among Catholics), a clear pattern emerges: traditionalists are most likely to take a militant internationalist stance, while modernists are much less likely to do so. Once again, the gap widens on items explicitly tapping military action, whether in pre-emptive response to hypothetical threats or the war in Iraq. These patterns suggest that opinion differences may be more strongly connected to religious beliefs than to simple ethnoreligious affiliation. Nevertheless, there is some interaction between tradition and beliefs: Evangelical traditionalists score highest on the MI scale, with 77 percent falling into the top half of the scale, followed by Mainline traditionalists at 65 percent, and Catholic traditionalists at 57 percent. Among modernists, on the other hand, the comparable proportions are only 50, 46 and 44 percent, respectively

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<sup>4</sup> Rather than using the dichotomous categories favored by Wuthnow (1988) and Hunter (1991), for illustration we adopt a more realistic three-part division of “traditionalists,” “centrists,” and “modernists” on the basis of respondents’ beliefs and behavior. Traditionalists are orthodox in belief and usually quite active in conventional religious activities, while modernists are more heterodox and tend to prefer less conventional forms of religious expression and engagement. Centrists, naturally, fall in between the other two camps on both religious belief and behavior.

The smaller religious traditions exhibit considerable variation on individual items, but for the most part score fairly low on the MI scale. The three exceptions are Mormons, who surpass Evangelicals in militant internationalism, Jews (who differ by providing strong support for Israel and much less for the Iraq war), and Latino Protestants, who are quite close to the national mean on most items and are split almost evenly on the MI scale. On the other hand, Latino Catholics, Unitarians and other liberal sects, small Christian groups, black Protestants, and non-Christian faiths (such as Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists), scored low on most MI questions and placed only small proportions in the “militant” half of the MI scale.

What about the religiously unaffiliated? Recent research reports have focused on the “growing” secular population as a new political force. Consistent with some other surveys, we find that about 15 percent of Americans claim no religious affiliation. As Table 1 shows, the unaffiliated are fairly distinctive on militant internationalism: less likely to want the U.S. to take an active role in the world, to see U.S. activity having special significance, to be preoccupied with fighting terrorism, to support Israel, to emphasize a strong military, to approve pre-emptive attacks, or to favor the Iraq war. Indeed, only about a third of the unaffiliated fall into the pro-MI half of the scale.

Still, as we have shown elsewhere (Green et al. 2007), the religiously unaffiliated are hardly monolithic. Many have religious beliefs and even carry on religious activities despite failure to affiliate with a specific religious body (“believers”); yet others are simply indifferent to religion and exhibit no religious beliefs or regular practices (“seculars”); and, still others are explicitly and consciously non-religious (“atheists” or “agnostics”). As Table 1 shows, unaffiliated believers mimic the sample as a whole and are evenly divided on the MI scale. Seculars, on the other hand, are much less supportive of militant internationalism, while

agnostics and atheists are least likely of all to be militant internationalists: only a small minority responds positively to any item and only 13 percent are in the top half of the scale.

This reconnaissance suggests that both ethnoreligious and restructuring theories have some predictive power on one central dimension of American foreign policy attitudes. The larger religious traditions, especially Evangelicals, provide much of the support for militant internationalist policies. On the other hand, smaller traditions, especially those based on distinctive ethnic identities, are much less enamored of militant internationalism. Clearly there are restructuring factors involved as well: in the major Christian groups there is a clear division between traditionalists, more supportive of militant policies, and modernists, much less so. Such differences may explain even the considerable differences among the unaffiliated, where the believers, seculars and agnostics/atheists are progressively less favorable toward militant internationalism as their distance from traditionalist belief increases. Indeed, those Americans who are most “restructured,” i.e. agnostics and atheists, are at the antimilitarist pole of the scale.

### ***Cooperative Internationalism***

What about the Cooperative Internationalism (CI) dimension? Although Mainline denominations and the Catholic Church have long been strong proponents of multilateral cooperation and efforts to solve problems of hunger and poverty around the world, much less of either the critical or empirical literature has focused on these issues. As we noted above, there are increasing numbers of press reports suggesting that religious factors may operate quite differently on what Wuthnow and Lewis (2008) refer to as “altruistic” foreign policy, involving international human rights, Third-World poverty, economic development, and global climate change. Although such conclusions are often based on pronouncements by religious elites or studies of religious interest group activity (e.g. Hertzke 2004; Farr 2008), the evidence for strong

effects of religious variables on such attitudes in the mass public are at best mixed (Wuthnow and Lewis 2008; Guth et al. 2005; Green 2007). In part, this may be due to the “newness” of these issues on the religious agenda or, as Wuthnow and Lewis (2008) argue, the absence of pervasive engagement strategies at the congregational level. Or, perhaps, to borrow an old political science distinction, these are “hard issues,” questions that are complex and difficult to assimilate quickly into an overarching ideological or religious perspective (cf. Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981).

[Table 2 about here]

How do religious citizens respond to cooperative internationalism? Although our cooperative internationalism scale has fewer items than the MI scale, the four available do serve as a reasonable basis for analysis: there are three items on priorities given to “improving the global environment,” “combating world hunger,” and “strengthening the United Nations,” along a query on whether respondents favored “strict rules to protect the environment, even though they cost jobs or result in higher prices.” These items not only tap some traditional concerns at the core of cooperative internationalism (see Chittick, Billingsley and Travis 1995, 318), but get at recent priorities involving global warming and environmental degradation. Table 2 shows that Americans are quite supportive of cooperative internationalism, with solid majorities putting a very high priority on improving the global environment and fighting world hunger, as well as protecting the environment generally. Only on strengthening the UN does the majority fall to a narrow plurality. Although these questions no doubt suffer from some “positivity bias,” other studies also show that Americans favor cooperative internationalism (Page 2006).

The global figures hide substantial religious differences, however. Evangelical Protestants fall below the sample means on all four items. (Remember that Evangelicals

constitute a quarter of the public, so the gap between Evangelicals and “all others” is even larger: 17 percentage points on the global environment, 8 on hunger, 13 on environmental protection, and 11 on the UN.) As a result, only 44 percent of Evangelicals fall into the top half of the CI scale, as compared to 61 percent of all other Americans (data not shown). Mainline Protestants and white Catholics, on the other hand, come much closer to national averages, varying by no more than a few percentage points either way on any of the four questions. Interestingly, on the summary scale Mainliners are slightly more favorable toward cooperative internationalism than are white Catholics, although differences are minimal.

As some scholars have argued, theological differences on these items are not as evident as on those in the MI scale. There is a tendency for traditionalists to be less “cooperative” than the other theological factions, but the differences are usually small and the centrists sometimes score higher than modernists do. On combating world hunger traditionalists and centrists both outscore modernists, reflecting perhaps historic religious concern with feeding the hungry. Among both Evangelicals and Mainliners, however, religious traditionalism is clearly associated with less support for the United Nations. Surprisingly, the same pattern does not appear among Catholics: the battles between the Vatican and UN over population control do not appear to have overcome more general Catholic internationalism. But the patterns of support are quite mixed.

The rest of Table 2 presents a clearer picture. Except for Latter-day Saints, *all* the smaller religious traditions show above-average support for cooperative internationalism on almost every item, although black Protestants lag on environmental protection. As both the individual items and summary score suggest, the most “cooperative” religious groups are the non-Christian world religions, where well over four-fifths fall into the top half of the CI scale. In most other categories as well, almost two-thirds are cooperative internationalists. Even Latino Protestants,

sometimes seen as a more “conservative” religious influence, contribute a substantial majority. Fittingly, those religious groups that in some sense represent the diversity of world religion are most prone to international cooperation. Thus, to the extent that ethnoreligious diversity increases in the United States, cooperative internationalism should prosper.

What about the unaffiliated? Once again, we find substantial differences among subsets of this category. The “believers” look much like the national sample, just as they did on the MI scale, but seculars and agnostics/atheists show some peculiar patterns: both are much more supportive of the two environmental causes than the U.S. public, but *less* favorable toward efforts to combat world hunger and strengthen the UN. Indeed, both groups differ quite starkly from the “minority” religious groups’ enthusiastic embrace of those priorities. Thus, while the non-religious population may provide additional support for national and international environmental efforts, it is not clear that such enthusiasm extends to other international causes or organizations.

### ***Religious Sources of Militant and Cooperative Internationalism***

The patterns in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that both militant and cooperative internationalism are indeed influenced by religious variables. In this section of the paper, we investigate in more detail exactly which religious factors shape Americans’ locations on these two dimensions. In addition, we introduce other influences on foreign policy attitudes as controls to determine whether religious factors have independent influence on attitudes, are simply artifacts of demographic characteristics, or work through more proximate factors such as ideology and partisanship.

In Table 3 we test a number of religious, political and demographic variables for their influence on militant and cooperative internationalism. Model 1 represents comprehensive “religious” explanations for the MI and CI scales. First, to test the impact of ethnoreligious group membership, we include dummies for each, with unaffiliated “believers” as the omitted reference category. (Remember that this group is close to the mean on almost all the component items.) We expect that Evangelical (and Latter-day Saint) affiliation should predict greater support for militant internationalism and less backing for cooperative internationalism. On the other hand, membership in the smaller ethnoreligious traditions, as well as in the secular and agnostic/atheist categories should have the opposite effect. We anticipate that Mainline and Catholic identities might wash out, given the greater internal diversity within these traditions.

[Table 3 about here]

We also include items that not only tap into the arguments of the religious restructuring theory, but also embody the religious claims made in the emerging foreign policy literature reviewed above. We have measures of *religious traditionalism* (Barker, Hurwitz and Nelson 2008), *religious activity* (Wuthnow and Lewis 2008), *moralism* (Guth 2009), *religious pluralism*, *civil religion* (Froese and Mencken 2009; Guth 2009), *dispensationalism* (Guth et al. 1996; Baumgartner, Francia and Morris 2008), and proximity to *religious left* and *religious right organizations* (see the Appendix for details on these measures). As one might expect, these religious variables are interrelated, but represent distinct conceptual and empirical measures. Our expectations, based on both theoretical claims and some previous empirical findings, are as follows: traditionalism, moralism, civil religion, dispensationalism and proximity to the religious right should enhance support for militant internationalism, while religious activity, belief in

religious pluralism, and feeling close to the religious left, all other things being equal, should bolster cooperative internationalism.

As Model 1 shows, religious variables are significant influences over both militant and cooperative internationalism, but especially the former. When all the religious variables are included in the MI regression, Evangelical, Mainline, Catholic and even Jewish affiliation predicts stronger support for militant internationalism, while only black Protestant and agnostic/atheist identification work in the other direction. The religious belief variables have a greater impact than religious affiliation (in separate analyses, they explain almost twice as much variance), with support for civil religion by far the most powerful force behind militant internationalism. Proximity to the religious right, moralism, traditionalism and, to a lesser extent, dispensationalism, encourage militant internationalism. On the other side, proximity to the religious left, belief in religious pluralism, and religious involvement work against militant internationalism.<sup>5</sup> Note that these religious variables alone account for almost one-quarter of the variance in the MI score, an impressive showing.

Although the MI and CI scales are only modestly correlated ( $r=.23$ ), the patterns of religious influence present a mirror image in many respects. In Model 1, Evangelical, Mormon, Catholic and (almost) Mainline identification work against cooperative internationalist sentiments, while Latino Catholic, black Protestant, and Non-Christian affiliations work in its favor. (Note that the secular and agnostic/atheist coefficients, however, are not significant and actually point in the wrong direction.) Proximity to religious left organizations, belief in religious pluralism, and greater religious involvement all work to foster cooperative internationalism,

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<sup>5</sup> Note that religious involvement has a significant *positive* relationship with militant internationalism at the bivariate level; the sign reverses only when the religious traditionalism, civil religion and other “conservative” variables associated positively with religious activity are in the equation. Thus, this coefficient probably represents what might be called “residual liberal activism.” For a review of similar findings in other studies, see Guth (2009).

while proximity to the religious right, traditionalist belief, and civil religion provide modest pushes in the other direction. Interestingly, dispensationalism shows no independent impact, despite its modern proponents' universal denigration of multilateral institutions (cf. Ruotsila 2008). The religious variables account for almost 14 percent of the variance, less than in the MI regression, but still respectable given the CI scale's limited range.

Model 2 adds variables previously found to be major factors influencing foreign policy attitudes: *ideology*, *partisanship*, *education*, *gender*, *income*, and *age* (cf. Holsti 2004; Page 2006). When this is done, we find some additional sources of MI and CI support. Not surprisingly, Republican partisanship contributes to support for militant internationalism, with an additional small boost from conservative ideology. Those with higher educations and incomes are also modestly more supportive, as are males, but age washes out. And although the introduction of political and demographic variables modestly reduces the coefficients for the significant religious variables in Model 1, almost all remain important predictors of militant internationalism, although black Protestant identity is apparently absorbed by these additional factors, and a couple of other coefficients drop just below statistical significance. Adding political and demographic variables increases the variance accounted for to an impressive 33 percent.

On cooperative internationalism, the story is a little different. When the political and demographic variables are introduced, several religious affiliations lose independent influence, presumably mediated by partisanship or ideology, as Democratic and liberal affinities bolster CI scores. Nevertheless, both Latino Protestant and Catholic affiliations provide added independent support for cooperative internationalism. The theological variables retain much of their power, although civil religion drops out of the equation as a negative influence. CI support is also

bolstered by higher education and income (just as MI scores were), but gender and age also make a difference here, as women and younger citizens are more inclined to support cooperative internationalism. All the variables combined account for one-quarter of the variance. As in the case of the MI equation, this proportion explained is a considerable improvement over most of those reported in the foreign policy opinion literature, despite the limited range of CI scores (cf. Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981, 618; Page 2006).

We conducted additional tests to uncover other possible influences on MI and CI orientations. Unfortunately, several promising variables were asked only in the post-election survey, with a smaller sample, so have not been included in this analysis. We found that Americans who saw foreign policy and social issue questions as the most important for their electoral choices were significantly more likely to support *both* militant and cooperative internationalism. Higher levels of political information bolstered militant internationalism, but not cooperative internationalism. We also tested several measures of exposure to religious media, clergy leadership cues, and religious interest group contacts, but almost none of them had an independent influence on either scale. The one exception was exposure to religious media, which modestly encouraged cooperative internationalist attitudes. On the whole then, religious affiliation and beliefs seem to dominate attitudes, not leadership cues. Nor did region of residence add any explanatory power: we found that once religious variables are in the equation, regional factors drop out. This suggests that the substantial regional effects discovered in several earlier studies were really tapping unmeasured religious influences (cf. Holsti 2004, 226-7).

### ***Religious Groups and the Militant/Cooperative Internationalist Typology***

As a final step in mapping the contribution of religious groups to the constellation of American foreign policy attitudes, we combine the two scales to produce the classic Wittkopf

typology. For heuristic purposes, we follow the usual procedure of dividing respondents at the zero point on each scale and combining the results to create four categories of *hardliners* (high on MI and low on CI), *internationalists* (high on both), *accommodationists* (low on MI, high on CI), and *isolationists* (low on both scales). The results put roughly 25 percent of the sample in the both the hardliner and internationalist camps, a third in the accommodationist category, and less than one-fifth in the isolationist group (Table 4).<sup>6</sup>

[Table 4 about here]

Several broad patterns are evident. First, Evangelicals are far more likely to fall into the hardliner category than any other religious group, followed at a considerable distance by Latter-day Saints. This tendency is largely explained by the very high proportion of Evangelical traditionalists (by far the largest group among Evangelicals), who take this stance. Evangelicals are proportionately represented among internationalists, but are far underrepresented among accommodationists and, to a lesser extent, isolationists. Mainliners and white Catholics are distributed much as the public as a whole, but traditionalists among them gravitate toward the hardliner camp while modernists inch toward the accommodationists or isolationists. Except for Jews and Latinos, who have a slight surplus of internationalists, the smaller religious traditions move toward the accommodationist and, in a few cases, toward the isolationist category. Indeed, in all these groups accommodationists are either the plurality or majority.

Unaffiliated respondents are another story, located overwhelmingly in the accommodationist and isolationist groups. Once again, unaffiliated believers are a microcosm of the general public, but seculars favor the accommodationist posture, and agnostic/atheist citizens

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<sup>6</sup> This distribution reveals something of the aggregate stability of the American public across time. Compared to Maggiotto and Wittkopf's 1974 survey, we have a few more hardliners and a few less isolationists. The major change is a six-point increase in the number of accommodationists and a comparable drop in the proportion of internationalists. This shift is certainly consistent with the changes in the composition of the American religious community over that period, as the minority religious groups and secular groups are likely to be accommodationists.

are even more concentrated in the accommodationist and isolationist camps. Thus, any substantial growth in minority ethnoreligious populations or in the numbers of secular citizens, will contribute to greater support for accommodationist policies—or, perhaps, in the latter case, in even greater isolationist sentiments.

### ***Conclusions***

While political science and international relations specialists have paid increasing attention to the role of religious organizations and movements in politics, there has been little sustained analysis of the way that religious factors influence Americans' attitudes on foreign policy. Although there is vast array of conjectures, there has been very little empirical analysis. Sometimes this reflects the absence of available data, in other cases the failure of analysts to employ a sophisticated understanding of religious history, institutions and ideas.

In this paper, we have investigated two recent themes in the journalistic and academic coverage of religion and American foreign policy. One theme stressed the influence that religious traditionalists, especially Evangelicals, had in supporting what scholars have called militant internationalism. We have found that a good bit of the speculation is correct; Evangelical Protestants and other religious traditionalists are more likely to favor policies consistent with that perspective. Much of this, as the multivariate analysis shows, reflects the influence of religious belief factors such as civil religion, traditionalism, moralism, and dispensationalism. In the broadest sense, these hardliners did indeed constitute a large part of the religious coalition supporting the policies of the Bush administration. But we found that other religious traditions have also distinct tendencies, as minority ethnoreligious groups and theological modernists often fell on the other end of this dimension.

We have also discovered religious influences on the dimension of cooperative internationalism, although it is clear that the influences are not as sharp or clearly defined. In part, this may be due to the relative newness of these issues on the international and national agenda. Religious and political elites have not had the time—or, perhaps, the ability—to educate constituencies in the connection between religious faith and attitudes on these issues. And although there are some commonalities in support for militant and cooperative internationalism, there is a clear tendency for the groups and factors providing support for the one to have the opposite influence on the other agenda. Although “conservative” beliefs work against cooperative internationalism, modernist beliefs and support for religious pluralism work in its favor. In addition, the “new” internationalism of American religion works strongly in favor of cooperative internationalism, as minority religious groups are among its strongest supporters. Thus, both ethnoreligious theory and restructuring theory have a role in explaining religion’s contributions to the American public’s foreign policy orientations.

Still, at this point it is not clear whether a new, consensual cooperative agenda might eventually attract support from a wider range of American religious groups, or whether this agenda might ultimately end up being absorbed by militant internationalism. The large Evangelical community will be an important actor here; currently divisions over the cooperative internationalist agenda have driven some major fissures through this community, as “new” leaders advocate aggressive championing of environmentalism, human rights, and international development, but face adamant resistance from entrenched conservatives.

What difference does all this make for American foreign policy? It is beyond the scope of this paper to settle the thorny questions of how and to what extent public opinion influences foreign policy decision-making (see Sobel 2001; Holsti 2004, 289-308; Page 2006). Of course,

foreign policy is primarily an executive prerogative and public opinion is most relevant in that context. American presidents have often taken into account and attempted to mobilize the forces of religion on behalf of their foreign policy objectives (Inboden 2008). We also know that the foreign policy views of political activists and legislators are influenced by religion in much the same way that the public is (Aguilar, Fordham and Lynch 1997; Green and Jackson 2007; Guth 2007). This suggests that public attitudes present both constraints and opportunities for presidential leadership at several levels.

Nevertheless, we need to exercise caution in interpreting the direction of influence. For example, even the most sensitive and informed of the speculative literature focusing on the Bush administration's policies attributes far too much influence to his religious constituency (e.g. Marsden 2008). In fact, the closest observers of Bush's decision-making scoff at arguments that he was responding to the demands of his religious constituency on most foreign policy issues. Nor, in fact, did the president personally share many of the theological emphases common within that constituency, despite journalistic claims to the contrary. It is clear, however, that public attitudes, shaped in part by religious factors, bolstered the president's public support, whether for his invasion of Iraq, his support for Israel—or his commitment to fighting AIDS in Africa (cf. Jacobson 2005).

The Obama administration is searching for the same kind of “supportive” religious coalition for its foreign policy. Both the president and Secretary of State Clinton are veteran participants in the world of American religious politics and hope to go beyond the confines of his religious electoral base (Green 2009) to building a broader religious coalition backing the cooperative internationalist dimension of American policy. This coalition will take a considerably different form than that supporting the Bush administration—but will by necessity

draw on elements of the same religious communities. This fact helps explain Obama's continual wooing of Evangelical opinion, his assiduous attention to the American Catholic bishops and Pope Benedict, and efforts to solidify ties with Mainline and black Protestant organizations. Although cooperative internationalism has a long history of elite support in many American religious communities, the specifics of such an approach have often been a much tougher sell at the grass-roots (Hero 1973). Although some observers see the globalization process providing a wider base for cooperative internationalism among American church people (Wuthnow 2009), the president's ability to foster that development among believers may determine his success in mobilizing public support for his international policies.

In the event that President Obama's policies take a swing toward the more militant side of internationalism, his religious coalition will shift accordingly. Support for the administration's escalation of efforts in Afghanistan, for example, is more likely to be forthcoming from Evangelicals and other traditionalists, than from the minority religious groups and theological modernists who were at the center of his electoral coalition. In the same vein, he may well discover that many Democratic "secularists" have little stomach for extensive American engagement abroad, whether militant or cooperative, preferring to retreat to a more isolationist stance. Indeed, the great internal diversity of the Democratic Party's religious constituency presents substantial obstacles in foreign policy, just as it does on domestic issues. During his campaign, President Obama and his staff exhibited impressive skills in managing that constituency; as president, he will need to use all those skills and more.

## *Appendix*

*Theological Traditionalism* is factor score described in Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth (2009, 25), utilizing five belief questions appropriate to the religious traditions of the vast majority of Americans. *Religious involvement* is a religious activity or behavior measure also described there, based on five common religious practices. We should note that a single measure of attendance at religious services is only slightly less powerful than the full factor score.

*Moralism* is a single Likert-scale item asking how strongly the respondent agreed or disagreed with the statement: “There are clear and absolute standards for right and wrong.”

*Pluralism* is a single Likert-scale item asking how strongly the respondent agreed or disagreed with the statement: “All the great religions of the world are equally true and good.”

*Civil religion* is a factor score derived from a principal components analysis of five items tapping the respondent’s sentiments about religion in public life. These include the perceived importance of religious faith to the respondent’s political thinking, whether or not the President should have a strong religious faith, whether politicians should discuss religion in public, and the appropriateness of the involvement of religious groups and institutions in the political process. (*Theta reliability*=.74). For more information, see Guth et al. (2006).

*Dispensationalism* is measured by a single Likert-scale item asking how strongly the respondent agreed or disagreed with the statement: “The world will end in a battle at Armageddon between Jesus and the Anti-Christ.”

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**Table 1.**

## Religious Group Support for Militant Internationalism (MI) in 2008 (in percent)

	<i>U.S. Must Take Active Part</i>	<i>Special US Role in World Politics</i>	<i>Fighting Terrorism Very High Priority</i>	<i>U.S. Should Support Israel Over Arabs</i>	<i>Strong Military Very High Priority</i>	<i>Approve Pre- emptive U.S. Attack</i>	<i>U.S. Should Stay in Iraq</i>	<i>Iraq War Was Justified</i>	<i>Proportion in Top Half of MI Scale</i>
<i>Entire Sample</i>	<b>43</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>50</b>
<i>Evangelical Protestant</i>	<b>50</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>66</b>
Traditionalists	59	67	80	68	65	80	64	72	76
Centrists	37	48	73	37	53	75	46	48	52
Modernists	40	53	72	36	48	74	50	47	49
<i>Mainline Protestant</i>	<b>49</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>53</b>
Traditionalists	51	57	78	54	55	72	62	61	65
Centrists	50	52	75	38	48	60	50	49	54
Modernists	46	46	69	35	40	61	49	39	44
<i>Catholic</i>	<b>50</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>53</b>
Traditionalists	53	51	82	44	54	66	58	46	57
Centrists	54	59	80	37	57	74	53	53	57
Modernists	42	42	68	32	48	66	41	44	44
<i>Smaller Traditions</i>									
Latter-Day Saints	60	72	79	41	69	67	72	77	69
Jewish	57	58	75	77	42	72	42	31	54
Latino Protestant	30	59	75	43	46	74	40	47	49
Latino Catholic	23	47	73	29	48	64	30	32	38
Unitarian/Liberal	35	46	48	33	23	38	34	19	20
Other Christian	31	29	58	27	32	34	21	24	24
Black Protestants	34	42	68	27	55	65	21	13	34
All Non-Christian	23	41	46	14	38	41	25	11	26
<i>Unaffiliated</i>	<b>38</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>33</b>
Believers	25	52	62	42	48	58	37	47	50
Secular	43	41	55	27	37	45	39	29	30
Agnostic/Atheists	34	31	33	20	30	27	25	11	13
<b>MI Factor Loading</b>	<b>.45</b>	<b>.55</b>	<b>.57</b>	<b>.58</b>	<b>.61</b>	<b>.61</b>	<b>.65</b>	<b>.69</b>	

Source: Fifth National Survey of Religion and Politics, University of Akron, 2008. (N=4000).

**Table 2.**

Religious Group Support for Cooperative Internationalism (CI) in 2008 (in percent)

	<i>Improving Global Environment High Priority</i>	<i>Combating World Hunger High Priority</i>	<i>Favor Strong Environment Protection</i>	<i>Strength of UN High Priority</i>	<i>Proportion of Group in Top Half of CI Scale</i>
<b>Entire Sample</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>Evangelical Protestant</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>44</b>
Traditionalists	43	52	41	31	36
Centrists	64	54	53	47	59
Modernists	48	50	47	47	49
<b>Mainline Protestant</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>57</b>
Traditionalists	56	54	60	37	53
Centrists	61	55	55	43	57
Modernists	66	50	65	47	61
<b>Catholic</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>55</b>
Traditionalists	54	65	60	45	54
Centrists	55	55	54	44	52
Modernists	63	50	64	44	59
<b>Smaller Traditions</b>					
Latter-Day Saints	49	58	50	46	48
Jewish	62	64	65	56	61
Latino Protestant	73	75	55	63	69
Latino Catholic	84	74	65	64	79
Unitarians	77	63	73	54	69
Other Christian	78	71	51	51	71
Black Protestants	71	73	43	55	66
All Non-Christian	84	84	84	72	85
<b>Unaffiliated</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>58</b>
Believers	62	59	46	48	57
Secular	69	52	68	43	59
Agnostic/Atheists	72	45	62	44	59
<b>CI Factor Loading</b>	<b>.78</b>	<b>.63</b>	<b>.67</b>	<b>.68</b>	

Source: Fifth National Survey of Religion and Politics, University of Akron, 2008. (N=4000).

**Table 3.****Religious Influences on Militant and Cooperative Internationalism (OLS regression)**

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>	
	<i>Religious Traditions + Religious Orientations</i>	<i>Religions Factors + Political Orientations + Demography</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>CI</i>
<b><i>Religious Tradition</i></b>				
Evangelical	.132**	-.100**	.090**	-.054
Latter-day Saints	.086**	-.042*	.047**	-.008
Catholic	.135**	-.070*	.102**	-.037
Mainline	.103**	-.049	.069	-.015
Jewish	.087**	.018	.081**	-.016
Latino Protestant	.022	.031	.023	.036*
Latino Catholic	-.002	.086**	.028	.062**
Black Protestant	-.070**	.046*	.003	-.014
Unitarian/Liberal	-.009	.005	-.014	.004
All Non-Christians	-.022	.043*	-.013	.028
Secular	.040	-.026	.024	-.016
Agnostic/Atheist	-.041*	-.023	-.044**	-.028
<b><i>Religious Orientations</i></b>				
Traditionalism	.068**	-.059**	.064**	-.055*
Religious Activity	-.042*	.082**	-.037	.080**
Moralism	.076**	.006	.066**	.020
Pluralism	-.095**	.157**	-.050**	.107**
Civil Religion	.206**	-.040*	.158**	-.012
Dispensationalism	.043*	-.004	.037*	-.002
Close Religious Left	-.151**	.186**	-.067**	.097**
Close Religious Right	.122**	-.145**	.077**	-.085**
<b><i>Ideological Factors</i></b>				
Conservative Ideology			.097**	-.164**
Republican Partisanship			.248**	-.208**
<b><i>Demographic Controls</i></b>				
Education			.059**	-.040*
Female			-.086**	.119**
Income			.077**	-.046**
Age			.022	-.069**
<b><i>Adj. R squared=</i></b>	<b>.239</b>	<b>.136</b>	<b>.333</b>	<b>.238</b>

Source: Fifth National Survey of Religion and Politics, University of Akron, 2008. (N=4000).

\*\*p&lt;.01; \*p&lt;.05

**Table 4.**

Religious Group Distribution in Foreign Policy Attitude (MC/CI) Typology, 2008 (in percent)

	<i>Hardliners</i>	<i>Internationalists</i>	<i>Accommodationists</i>	<i>Isolationists</i>
<i>Entire Sample</i>	<b>25</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>18</b>
<i>Evangelical Protestant</i>	<b>42</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>14</b>
Traditionalists	52	24	12	12
Centrists	25	26	32	16
Modernists	29	21	28	23
<i>Mainline Protestant</i>	<b>25</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>18</b>
Traditionalists	33	32	21	14
Centrists	26	28	29	18
Modernists	19	25	36	20
<i>Catholic</i>	<b>28</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>18</b>
Traditionalists	30	27	27	17
Centrists	33	25	27	16
Modernists	20	24	35	21
<i>Smaller Traditions</i>				
Latter-Day Saints	36	34	14	16
Jewish	22	32	30	17
Latino Protestant	20	29	40	11
Latino Catholic	9	29	50	12
Unitarian/Liberal	7	13	56	24
Other Christian	14	10	61	15
Black Protestants	9	25	41	25
All Non-Christian	5	21	64	10
<i>Unaffiliated</i>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>25</b>
Believers	25	25	32	18
Secular	15	15	44	27
Agnostic/Atheists	8	5	54	33

Source: Fifth National Survey of Religion and Politics, University of Akron, 2008. (N=4000).