



Religion and the Creation of European Identity: The Message of the Flags

Brent F. Nelsen & James L. Guth

To cite this article: Brent F. Nelsen & James L. Guth (2016) Religion and the Creation of European Identity: The Message of the Flags, *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, 14:1, 80-88, DOI: [10.1080/15570274.2016.1145476](https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2016.1145476)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2016.1145476>



Published online: 24 Mar 2016.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



RELIGION AND THE CREATION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY: THE MESSAGE OF THE FLAGS

By Brent F. Nelsen and James L. Guth

From the very beginning, proponents of European integration knew that ordinary citizens would be crucial to achieving their ultimate objective: a new supranational identity, undergirding a united continental polity. National leaders might develop a deep mutual sense of community through interaction in European institutions and try to foster a “European” identity among their publics, but if citizens did not feel that same sense of community, unity would not be possible. Economic, social, and political integration would proceed just as far as growth of a common identity allowed.

Although some theorists argue that the European Union (EU) does not require a *demos* to achieve democratic legitimacy (Weiler 1995), most scholars and EU political leaders have sought a common bond strong enough to unite peoples divided by language, nationality, class, religion, ethnicity, and other social markers. Indeed, from the very start of the integration project its leaders sought to build a new identity, assuming that eventual union required emergence of what Deutsch et al. (1957) famously called a “we feeling” among national publics. Today, more than ever, the EU must have the support of a “people” to make difficult policy choices, whether on preserving the Eurozone, revising basic economic regulation, addressing the migrant crisis, or dealing with terrorism (Delanty 1995;

Schmitter 2000; Siedentop 2001; Schmidt 2006; Maas 2007).

Many scholars have addressed the vital question of whether citizens of the EU have been developing such a shared identity. Most find that at least some folks are coming to think of themselves as “Europeans,” not just as British, French, German, or Maltese. For a few citizens that European identity may be “primary,” or even “exclusive,” but for most it is added to a still-dominant national identification. Of course, many others still think of themselves exclusively in national terms (Bruter 2005). Scholars attribute the creation of existing “European” identity variously to factors such as economic prosperity, expanded higher education, greater international mobility, the decline of traditionalism, and the rise of “postmaterial” values such as social tolerance (Keulman and

Brent F. Nelsen is Professor of Political Science at Furman University. He is the co-author (with James Guth) of *Religion and the Struggle for European Union: Confessional Culture and the Limits of Integration* (Georgetown University Press, 2015). He is chair of the South Carolina Educational Television Commission and serves on the Board of Directors of the U.S. Corporation for Public Broadcasting. He has written extensively on European Union politics.

James L. Guth is William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Political Science at Furman University. He has written extensively on the role of religion in American and European politics. In 2008 he received the Paul J. Weber Award for the best paper on religion and politics presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Koós 2014). All of these have encouraged at least some Europeans to identify with a political entity beyond their own national borders.

Most scholars have neglected the role that religion might play in identity creation. This is rather surprising, given the origins of the European integration project. The EU's Christian Democratic founders, mostly devout Catholics, saw themselves as "national identity constructors" and often found common symbols for the budding European polity in Christian or Carolingian iconography. And during this same period the Vatican and national Catholic hierarchies provided firm and often vocal support for the "uniting of Europe." The passing of this Christian Democratic generation and dramatic secularization did not end elite identity construction efforts, but did result in less overt use of religious symbolism (Foret 2015; Nelsen and Guth 2015).

Religion also played a role in bolstering public support for the European project. Although the *Eurobarometer* (EB) series tapping public attitudes toward integration since the early 1970s did not often include religion questions, the few that did revealed substantial impact. The historic transnationalism of the Catholic Church made its adherents natural supporters of a united Europe, while the nationalism of Protestant churches worked in the other direction. And generally, the most observant members of each tradition exhibited these confessional tendencies more strongly than less committed believers. Religious influences persisted or became even stronger under rigorous statistical controls for other determinants of support for integration emphasized by most scholars (e.g. nationality, party identification, ideology, political engagement, postmaterial values, economic situation, gender, class, and education).

From 1973 to 2006, Catholics in the Nine (the Six, plus Britain, Denmark, and Ireland) were significantly more favorable toward the European Community/Union than those of other faiths or no faith. Furthermore, devout Catholics—regular Mass attenders—showed the strongest support. Protestants exhibited much less enthusiasm for integration, although in some

later years greater devotion actually *increased* support, perhaps because the growing ecumenism in Protestant state churches encouraged more positive views of supranationalism. "Cultural" Protestants who do not regularly practice often remain most skeptical of supranational cooperation. And scattered evidence strongly suggests that the small groups of sectarian or "free church" Protestants are much less integrationist than those in "established" churches. Despite some attrition over the past 40 years, these patterns still persist in public support for the EU, at least until very recently (Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser 2001; Nelsen and Guth 2003; Nelsen, Guth, and Highsmith 2011).

Does religion influence "European identity" in the same way that it shapes public support for integration? A quick look at aggregate national data suggests that it might. For example, a 2004 EB shows a fairly strong correlation ($r = .42$) between the proportion of Protestants in each member state and those identifying only with their own nation—and not with "Europe," while "Catholic" countries have higher levels of "Europeanness." Of course, we need to examine this relationship at the individual level and, given recent trends, must expand the analysis in several directions. First, we need to consider other religious groups, such as Eastern Orthodox Christians and Muslims, growing in numbers in the expanded EU (Kaufmann 2010). Many scholars see religious minorities such as Muslims as natural EU citizens, given the absence of long-term national identification with their state of residence and the greater responsiveness of EU institutions to their concerns (Pastorelli 2012; Keulman and Koós 2014, 217), while others see them reacting adversely to the EU's reputation as a "Christian club" (Nelsen and Guth 2016). In addition, some observers have recently argued that general religiosity provides encouragement to the development of broader European identities, whatever the religious tradition (Keulman and Koós 2014), but others see Christian religion implicated in the rise of nationalist parties in many EU countries (Risse 2010). Finally, secularization has created more atheists and agnostics, viewed by many scholars as the vanguard of cosmopolitan "Europeanness"

(Inglehart 1970, 1990). The perspectives of all these groups deserve attention.

Unfortunately, no recent *EB* permits a direct test of the relationship between religion and European identity: none includes explicit questions on both identity and religion. But *EB* 65.2 (Spring 2006) allows a strong, if indirect test, asking several questions tapping public attitudes toward the EU flag, which Risse has called an “identity marker” for Europeans (2010, 58). For illustration here, we consider two questions that best gauge the core of European identity: whether respondents personally “identify” with the EU flag and whether they think it should always be flown next to their national flag on public buildings. Arguably, those who answer both queries positively are the model “Europeans” that EU elites and integration scholars have long sought to create.¹

How do religious groups react to the European flag? In Table 1 we report the proportions of those in major religious traditions who react to the flag questions in various ways. To simplify things, we reduce the possible combinations of “yes,” “not sure,” “don’t know” and “no” for the two questions into three categories: those who identify with the EU flag and want it flown on all public buildings next to their own (“Europeans”), those who neither identify with nor want the flag flown next to their national flag (“Nationals”), and those with mixed or more equivocal responses.

First of all, note the distribution of public attitudes toward the flag: almost two-fifths of EU citizens say they identify with the flag and want it flown everywhere in official settings, but a group almost as large has more mixed reactions, giving positive responses to only one of the queries or being undecided on at least one. Finally, about one-quarter of EU citizens neither identify with the flag nor want it flown on public buildings. In sum, there is a substantial bloc of Europeans who show solid “flag identity,” an equal number who are not quite so sure, and a resolute minority that resists this symbol of the emerging European polity.

How does religion influence such “European identity”? As Table 1 shows, there are substantial differences among religions, and substantial

Table 1. European identity: religious identification with EU flag and preference for use.

	“Europeans”	“Mixed”	“Nationals”
Entire sample (%)	39.2	37.9	23.0
Muslims	52.7	24.6	22.7
Other non-Christians	50.2	28.3	21.4
Catholics	45.5	38.3	16.3
Majority	47.4	37.7	14.9
Plurality	38.6	40.0	21.3
Minority	21.3	45.2	33.3
Eastern Orthodox	39.2	33.8	27.0
Protestants	28.9	36.8	34.3
Minority	44.9	40.8	14.3
Plurality	39.4	36.7	23.9
Majority	16.2	36.4	47.3
Other Christians (mostly “free church”)	28.8	36.3	35.0
Atheists	28.7	44.5	26.8

Notes: “Europeans” are those who both identify with the EU flag and want it flown next to their national flag on all public buildings; “Nationals” are those who neither identify with nor want the flag flown next to their national flag; “Mixed” are those with more equivocal responses.

Source: *EB* 65.2, *EU25*; $N = 24,693$, *EU25* weight.

variation within major religious groups, depending on their status as a national majority, plurality, or minority faith.

First, Catholics and Protestants conform to expected patterns: Catholics are more likely to identify with the flag and want it flown, while Protestants are much more resistant (46 v. 29 percent). Indeed, over one-third of Protestants neither identify with nor want the flag flown, compared to only 16 percent of Catholics. But members of both traditions vary in fascinating ways according to the status of their faith in national settings. Among Catholics, the strongest “Europeans” are those who live in majority Catholic countries, while those who live with Protestants in “plurality” societies are less enthusiastic, and Catholics who are small minorities in (mostly) Protestant nations have the least liking for the flag. This suggests that some degree of “national” socialization may be taking place: Catholic minorities may be adopting the “Protestant” position on supranationalism and Catholic pluralities may be making similar, if smaller adjustments.

For Protestants, the pattern is reversed. Like most other religious minorities, minority Protestants are quite favorable toward the flag, perhaps reflecting the attitude of their Catholic neighbors. (Or perhaps, they see the flag as an emblem of *protection* from national Catholic majorities.) “Plurality” Protestants are a good bit less positive than their minority brethren, while Protestants in a majority status very seldom fall into the top layer of “flag identity”; indeed, almost half neither identify with nor want the EU flag flown. Note that “Other Christians” look very much like Protestants. And that is because they probably are: although the *EB*’s coding does not allow us to be sure, their distribution suggests that they are “evangelical” or “free church” Protestants, historically known for their strong anti-EU sentiments.

Second, as some scholars predict, non-Christian religious minorities do have fairly strong “European” identity, perhaps because of limited time for national socialization or perhaps because they see EU institutions as more receptive to their interests than national governments. Given the large *EB* sample, we are able to separate Muslims from other non-Christians, but both categories look about the same in attitudes on the flag. That this finding is not an aberration is suggested by the fact that we find similar results for other questions on support for the EU among Muslims and other religious minorities in the 2009 and 2014 European Parliament Election Studies (Nelsen and Guth 2016).

Two other religious groups deserve some comment. Eastern Orthodox Christians fall about in the middle of the spectrum, with just slightly less “flag identity” than the whole sample. As these 2006 respondents come primarily from Greece, we should not draw too many conclusions, as more recent accessions have added new Orthodox contingents from several eastern European countries, with others in the EU pipeline. More telling perhaps, is the attitude of the large contingent of self-labelled atheists, often seen as the vanguard of postmaterial, secular, and cosmopolitan values, taking Europe “beyond the nation state.” In fact, this group is much less “European” than Catholics are, and they barely

exceed Protestants. Of course, it may be possible that these are sophisticates who simply refuse to salute any flag, but readily espouse supranational identity in other ways. That possibility seems unlikely, however, as we see similar findings for atheists on other markers of European identity (see Nelsen and Guth 2014).

What are the effects of religious observance or commitment? Does it contribute to European identity as Keulman and Koós (2014) claim? Or does it foster anti-EU nationalism as Risse (2010) argues? Or perhaps, does the impact of religiosity depend on its context? The answer is actually quite complex. Looking at religiosity among all EU citizens there is a mild tendency for the observant to be more “European” on our flag measure ($r = .12$), but that effect varies slightly by religious group. Among Catholics generally, observance has a positive effect on identity ($r = .09$). Among all Protestant groups observance also has a mild “Europeanizing” tendency ($r = .10$), although that effect attenuates or even reverses among the most devout—a pattern we see among devout Catholics in some countries as well. And among the non-Christian minorities, religious observance works *against* support for the flag. As we shall see below, however, these tendencies are modified by religion’s national status.

A Test Against Competing Theories

Although most scholars have said little about religion’s influence on European identity, they have churned out a variety of other theories (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; McLaren 2006; Jones, Menon, and Weatherhill 2012). Some have focused on utilitarian explanations, arguing that those who benefit most directly from European economic integration are most likely to assume the broader identity of “European.” Usually these beneficiaries are identified by occupation, education, income, or social class: the “Europeans” are the high-status, mobile, well-educated business and professional elites whose pocketbooks are fattened by the EU (Gabel 1998). Other scholars have stressed cognitive or political explanations: those who know a lot about European institutions, are interested in politics and politically engaged are more likely to

be “Europeans” (Inglehart 1970). Some have made the case for “value” explanations: those who have “postmaterial” values stressing the environment, quality of life, social tolerance, and personal freedom are more likely to have broader identities than those who focus on “materialist” values (Inglehart 1990). Finally, others argue for ideological explanations, seeing “Europeanness” as an artifact of left, right, or even centrist political thinking, or perhaps of “neo-liberal” ideology (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2012; Nelsen, Guth, and Highsmith 2011).

We have included all these approaches in our previous analyses and have found that each explains at least some of the development of European identity (Nelsen and Guth 2014). The question for our purposes is whether the religious differences we have seen to this point are merely the artifacts of more powerful influences. To consider this possibility, and to formalize somewhat our previous discussion, we have produced a more rigorous test for the impact of religious variables on attitudes toward the European flag, reported in Table 2.

The first model in Table 2 reports the results of a multiple regression analysis of attitudes toward the flag using only religious variables. (Religiously unaffiliated respondents, Eastern Orthodox, and unidentified respondents constitute the omitted reference groups, as these in combination are very close to the overall mean score on the flag variable.) As the first column shows, most of the religious measures used above have an impact on public views of the flag. Catholic affiliation combined with national status has a strong positive influence on “European” approaches to the flag, while Protestant affiliation combined with national status has a slightly stronger one in the other direction. Thus, the larger the Catholic population in a country, the stronger the identification with the EU flag; the larger the Protestant sector, the weaker the support.²

The impact of religious commitment also varies by each tradition’s national status. The more observant the Catholic, the more he or she identifies with the flag, although this tendency is strongest in majority Catholic countries,

somewhat weaker in plurality countries, and actually reverses among Catholic minorities. Among Protestants, commitment increases a “European” response only among Protestants living as small minorities; for Protestant majorities and pluralities, commitment has virtually no impact. Other Christians, as suggested by Table 1, are less supportive of the flag, but commitment has no added effect, while non-Christian religious minorities (here combined for analysis) identify more strongly, but again, commitment levels do not have an independent influence. Finally, atheists are neither more nor less likely to identify with or want the flag flown than the reference category, very close to the overall mean. The religious factors alone explain a very respectable 6.1 percent of the variance.

Are these religious influences simply the artifact of more powerful demographic, ideological, or sociological influences? In Model 2 we have controlled for a wide variety of alternative explanations, most of which demonstrate some utility in explaining attitudes. As we have demonstrated previously, the most powerful alternative explanations are utilitarian and political: those who benefit from the EU, hold neo-liberal economic attitudes, are most optimistic about the economic future, and are most politically knowledgeable are the strongest supporters of the flag. In addition, trust in national political institutions actually increases identification with European institutions (coefficients not shown). With these variables in the analysis the variance explained jumps to 16.5 percent, an impressive result (cf. Nelsen and Guth 2014).³

Nevertheless, this exercise does not eliminate or even reduce very much the independent effects of religious factors. As Table 2 shows, the coefficients for most of the religious variables in Model 2 are almost as large as in Model 1—and in some cases actually *increase* with the addition of controls. There are a couple of small twists: when everything is taken into account, religious commitment becomes a negative predictor of European identity among both majority Protestants and among non-Christian religious

Table 2. European identity: multivariate test of religious influence (OLS betas).

Religious variable	Model 1 religious variables only	Model 2 with controls ^a
Catholic		
Catholic majority/plurality/minority	.086***	.110***
x Majority Catholic commitment	.108***	.080***
x Plurality Catholic commitment	.047***	.061***
x Minority Catholic commitment	-.036**	-.072***
Protestant		
Protestant majority/plurality/minority	-.105***	-.097***
x Majority Protestant commitment	-.017	-.045***
x Plurality Protestant commitment	-.010	-.015
x Minority Protestant commitment	.110***	.098***
Other Christian affiliation (“free church”)	-.035**	-.029*
x Other Christian commitment	.001	.001
All other religions	.061***	.061***
x All other religions commitment	-.019	-.043***
Atheist	-.009	-.005
Adjusted R ²	.061	.165

Source: *EB 65.2, EU25; N = 24,693, EU25 weight.*

^aControls include ideology, postmaterial values, strength of national attachments and trust in national government institutions, political information and engagement, occupational status, education, size of place, age, gender, and diversity of national background.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

*** $p < .001$.

minorities. But aside from this, very little changes from Model 1 to Model 2, demonstrating the strong independent effects of religion. Note also that religious variables explain well over a third of the total variation accounted for in Model 2, a remarkable finding given the range and power of the control variables.

Indeed, detailed scrutiny of the full results shows that religious factors are more powerful than some influences celebrated in the integration literature. Just to provide two examples: Inglehart’s “postmaterial” values battery has long been a focus of analysis, supposedly demonstrating the broad influence of “value change” among Western publics generally (Inglehart 1990). And yet the postmaterialism index virtually drops out of the analysis when religious variables are included (beta = .022). “Postmaterialists,” then, are not much more likely than “Materialists” to take on a European identity. Similarly, ideological variables show little influence, with “left” ideology having no

significant effect whatever (beta = .001), and right ideology having a modest *negative* impact (beta = -.038). We might go on in this vein, but the upshot is clear: as recently as a decade ago, religious factors were still strong and independent sources of European (and national) identities, more influential than many factors more often stressed by analysts.

Conclusions

As scholars and politicians alike have discovered, the foundations of European identity have always been elusive. The persistent efforts of integration enthusiasts to produce a “we-feeling” among citizens of the EU have met with some success; studies have shown that utilitarian assessments incorporating economic evaluations, and ideological factors such as neo-liberalism, have had a considerable impact on citizens’ identification with the EU. We have demonstrated that religion, a neglected factor in studies of European identity, also shapes that

identity in significant, if complex ways. Generally our results parallel those in studies of individual support for the EU itself: Catholics tend to identify more strongly with the EU than Protestants do, but the direction and strength of the influence is dependent on the national religious context, with a strong “socialization” effect that tends to minimize (or even reverse) the effect of religion in minority contexts. Thus, Catholic minorities in Protestant countries tend to distrust the EU (like their neighbors), and Protestants in Catholic countries tend to feel more “European” (like their neighbors). In most instances, religious commitment now appears to bolster European identity modestly, even among Protestants traditionally skeptical about “Europe,” although that effect is more uncertain among non-Christian minorities.

Nevertheless, several recent trends suggest that the identity construction project in Europe has bogged down during the EU’s rapid expansion since 2004. Recent developments have probably undermined the positive influence of Catholic (and, perhaps, Protestant) devotion on public identification with “Europe.” The most obvious factor is the continuing secularization of the continent, which has reduced the number of observant Catholics (and Protestants), the old and (perhaps) “new” core support groups for the EU. Just as problematic are recent changes in the impact of remaining Catholic devotion. In the 2006 data we already see attrition of support among the most devout Catholics. This tendency was strongest in Eastern European countries such as Poland and Hungary, but also appeared elsewhere, as in Ireland. This development no doubt reflected concern over the implications of EU social policies, whether on abortion, family planning, gay rights, or, perhaps, the failed effort to incorporate recognition of Europe’s Christian heritage in the proposed EU Constitution in 2003.

In addition, the strongest negative effects of the financial and Eurozone crises have been

concentrated in Catholic-majority nations, clearly producing more Euroscepticism. Indeed, there seems to have been some remarkable changes in religious group support for the EU between the 2009 and 2014 European Parliamentary (EP) elections. Preliminary analysis of the 2009 data reveals that the “traditional” religious patterns were still firmly in place, but Catholic support for the EU had dropped dramatically by the 2014 EP elections (authors’ forthcoming analysis). If the fate of European identity is bound up with support for the EU itself (the historic pattern), these findings do not auger well for the growth of such identity in the immediate future.

The contemporary immigration and refugee

crises have also influenced religion’s contribution to EU support and, most likely, European identity. In the past few years we see clear signs of some Catholic movement toward populist anti-immigrant parties in several European countries (Nelsen and Guth 2015, 312–316), movements which have the ironic effect of reinforcing nationalism, often in the

CATHOLICS TEND TO IDENTIFY MORE STRONGLY WITH THE EU THAN PROTESTANTS DO, BUT THE DIRECTION AND STRENGTH OF THE INFLUENCE IS DEPENDENT ON THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS CONTEXT

name of preserving or protecting “Christian Europe.”⁴ Although Catholic leaders from Pope Frances on down to many national bishops have sought to counter this trend, as have many Protestant leaders, it has considerable popular appeal in a continent seemingly under siege from Islamic terrorism and non-Christian immigration. Perhaps a recent political decision involving the EU flag, our chosen illustrative “marker” of European identity, reveals the convergence of these forces. Heavily Catholic Poland has, since the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, been one of the most enthusiastic participants in the European project, reflecting in part the strong encouragement of the late Pope John Paul II and most of the Polish Catholic hierarchy, who saw Poland’s “return to Europe” both as an affirmation of essential identity and as an opportunity to return Europe itself to its Christian foundations. These efforts from the beginning were challenged by ultra-traditionalist

Polish Catholics who saw the EU as the carrier of non- or even anti-Christian values. That tendency has largely been given political expression through the Law and Justice Party, recently returned to power in Poland. And one of the first symbolic actions of that new government was to remove the EU flag from official governmental functions, reflecting the growing Euroscepticism among its heavily traditionalist Catholic leadership and electoral constituency (Sobczyk 2015).

Will the creation of European identity resume in the near future? The auguries are not good. As the traditional religious underpinnings of Europeanness erode, as economic crises

undermine the utilitarian value of the EU itself, and as the continent struggles to absorb new populations of varying faiths and cultures, the prospects for creation of a continental identity might seem dim. But then the idea of a peaceful, economically integrated, and united Europe was not much more than a dim dream in 1945, either. It became reality nonetheless through the persistent efforts of European political and spiritual leaders striving to overcome the ruins of war and depression. Perhaps the current European crises will give rise to comparably effective responses. If this happens, the European identity formation process may find new life. ❖

Notes

1. Elsewhere we have used a variety of alternative proxy “markers” for European identity, but these work in a very similar manner to the flag question (Nelsen and Guth 2014). We think the flag questions really tap a fundamental emotional vein in most respondents, essential to identity formation. Adding in other questions concerning the EU flag produces some additional insights but complicates the analysis unnecessarily for our purposes here.
2. Each of the “majority” variables is coded 1 “National majority,” 2 “Plurality,” and 3 “Minority.” The interactive terms for commitment look at the effect of commitment among Catholics and Protestants in each type of national setting and for other Christians and non-Christian groups as groups.
3. We have not shown the coefficients for these variables in the table, as we are focusing on religious influences, but interested readers may contact us for the full results.
4. We should note that analysis of the 2014 EP Elections Study shows that the constituencies of most of the new European “populist” parties on the right are much more secular than those of their Christian Democratic opponents—or sometimes, even, their Socialist antagonists. Nevertheless, many populist leaders make overt appeals to Europe’s “Christian heritage,” supposedly under threat from immigrants and religious minorities.

References

- Bruter, M. 2005. *Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Delanty, G. 1995. *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Deutsch, K. W., S. A. Burrell, R. A. Kann, M. Lee Jr., M. Lichterman, R. E. Lindgren, F. L. Loewenheim, and R. W. Van Wagenen. 1957. *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Eichenberg, R. C., and R. J. Dalton. 1993. “Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration.” *International Organization* 47: 507–534.
- Foret, F. 2015. *Religion and Politics in the European Union: The Secular Canopy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gabel, M. J. 1998. *Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Hooghe, L., and G. Marks. 2005. “Calculation, Community and Cues.” *European Union Politics* 8 (1): 37–59.
- Hooghe, L., and G. Marks. 2012. “Politicization.” In *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*, edited by E. Jones, A. Menon, and S. Weatherhill, 840–853. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Inglehart, R. 1970. “Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity.” *Comparative Politics* 3: 45–70.
- Inglehart, R. 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jones, E., A. Menon, and S. Weatherhill, eds. 2012. *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kaufmann, E. 2010. *Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?* London: Profile Books.

- Keulman, K., and A. K. Koós. 2014. *European Identity: Its Feasibility and Desirability*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Maas, W. 2007. *Creating European Citizens*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- McLaren, L. M. 2006. *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nelsen, B. F., and J. L. Guth. 2003. "Religion and Youth Support for the European Union." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41 (1): 89–112.
- Nelsen, B. F., and J. L. Guth. 2014. "Religion in the Creation of European and National Identities: An Empirical Test of Identity Construction." Paper presented at the oxford symposium on religious studies, University Church of St Mary, Oxford University, December 8–10.
- Nelsen, B. F., and J. L. Guth. 2015. *Religion and the Struggle for European Union: Confessional Culture and the Limits of Integration*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Nelsen, B. F., and J. L. Guth. 2016. "Religion and Support for the European Union: European Muslims in a Christian Club?" Paper prepared for a conference on Muslims and the European Union, Izmir University, March.
- Nelsen, B. F., J. L. Guth, and C. R. Fraser. 2001. "Does Religion Matter? Christianity and Public Support for the European Union." *European Union Politics* 2 (2): 191–217.
- Nelsen, B. F., J. L. Guth, and B. Highsmith. 2011. "Does Religion Still Matter? Religion and Public Attitudes toward Integration in Europe." *Politics and Religion* 4 (1): 1–26.
- Pastorelli, S. 2012. "Public Policies toward New Religions." In *Politics of Religion in Western Europe: Modernities in Conflict*, edited by F. Foret and X. Itçaina, 213–240. London: Routledge.
- Risse, T. 2010. *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Schmitter, P. C. 2000. *How to Democratize the European Union ... and Why Bother?* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Schmidt, V. A. 2006. *Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Siedentop, L. 2001. *Democracy in Europe*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sobczyk, M. M. 2015. "Poland's Ruling Party Seeks to Replace Judges Who Have Final Say on Laws." *Wall Street Journal*, November 26.
- Weiler, J. H. H. 1995. "Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos, and the German Maastricht Decision." *European Law Journal* 1 (3): 219–258.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2016.1145476>