The Dred Scott Case and the Missouri Compromise.

We have already published the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had decided this much talked of case, involving the Missouri Compromise question, and pronouncing the latter unconstitutional. We find in the St. Louis Intelligencer of the 7th inst., a telegraphic synopsis of the decision, which our readers will deem interesting.

It will be seen that the Court have also decided that Congress cannot confer on a territorial legislature, power to make enactments relative to the personal property of citizens of the United States in federal territory. This is a seeming blow at the doctrine of squatter sovereignty, but not quite as hard a one as we could wish the Court had given. As Congress has no power to exclude slavery from the territory and confer freedom upon negroes, it cannot confer that power on territorial agents. The stream can rise no higher than the fountain, as a matter of course. But Gen. Cass contends that the territories have this power, not so much by donation from Congress, as by some inherent sovereignty of their own. And this inherent sqatter sovereignty, (not derivative jurisdiction,) the Court did not pass upon. The question probably did not come before the Court. The opinion, however, as to Congressional power, is full of interest and point.

WASHINGTON March 6....The decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case was delivered to-day, by Chief Justice Taney. It was a full and elaborate statement of the views of the court, and they have decided that the following are all the important points:

First, That negroes, either slaves or free, as men of the race, are not citizens of the United States, by the constitution.

Second, That the Ordinance of 1787 had no independent constitutional force or legal effect subsequently to the adoption of the constitution, and could not operate of itself to confer the freedom or citizenship within the Northwest territory, of negroes, not citizens by the constitution.

Third, That the provisions of the act of 1820, commonly called the Missouri compromise, is, so far as it undertook to exclude negro slavery from, and confer freedom and citizenship to the negro in the northern part of the Louisiana cession, was a legislative act exceeding the powers of Congress void and of no legal effect to that end.

In deciding these main points, the Supreme Court have determined upon the following incidental points:

First, The expression "territory and other property" of the Union in the constitution applies in terms only to such territory as the Union posessed at the time of adopting the constitution.

Second, The rights of citizens of the United States emigrating to any federal territory under the power of the federal government there, depend upon the general provisions of the constitution, which defines in this, as well as in all other respects, the powers of Congress. As Congress does not possess the power itself to make enactments relative to the personal property of citizens of the United States in federal territory, other than such as the constitution confers, so it cannot constitutionally delegate any such power to a territorial government organized by it under the constitution.

Third, The legal condition of a slave in the State of Missouri is not affected by the temporary sojourn of such slave in any other State, but on his return his condition still depends upon the laws of Missouri, and as the plaintiff was not a citizen of Missouri, therefore he could not sue in the courts of the United States, and the suit must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The delivery of this opinion occupied about three hours. It was listened to with profound attention by a crowded court room.